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Introduction: Reconsidering detachment 
 
Matei Candea, Joanna Cook, Catherine Trundle and Thomas Yarrow 
 
This volume urges a reconsideration of the productive potential of disconnection, 
distance and detachment, as ethical, methodological and philosophical commitments. 
In so doing, we write against the grain of a strong tendency in contemporary social 
theory and public life. Engagement has, in a wide range of contexts, become a 
definitive and unquestionable social good, one that encompasses or abuts with a 
number of other seductive cultural tropes, such as participation, democracy, voice, 
equality, diversity and empowerment. Conversely, detachment has come to symbolize 
a range of social harms: authoritarianism and hierarchy, being out of touch, 
bureaucratic coldness and unresponsiveness, a lack of empathy, and passivity and 
inaction. Yet as this book will argue, in a wide range of settings detachment is still 
socially, ethically and politically valued, and the relationship between detachment and 
engagement is not simple or singular.  
 
The volume developed as a result of an on-going and collaborative enquiry into 
detachment by the editors. Beginning with a discussion over a glass of wine on a 
sunny afternoon in December 2008, we reflected on the diverse ways in which we 
each separately encountered detachment in our work. In examining the disciplinary 
relationship between archaeology and anthropology, Yarrow found that it is precisely 
the disconnection and difference between the ways in which these disciplines produce 
knowledge that sets up the possibility for productive engagement (Yarrow and 
Garrow 2010). Following Candea’s fieldwork in a research station in the Kalahari 
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desert, where behavioural biologists observe the daily lives of meerkats, he was struck 
by the peculiar non-interactive relations researchers established with the wild 
meerkats they studied through what they called ‘habituation’ (Candea 2010; 2013a). 
This was no ideological pretense of objective distance, but an embodied practice of 
detached relationality – a detachment which in turn required volunteers to detach 
themselves from parts of themselves (Candea 2013)
1
. 
 
In her work on vipassana meditation, Cook (2010) explored the ways in which Thai 
monastics engage with specific ascetic introspection techniques in order to cultivate 
forms of detachment that are consistent with Buddhist teachings. Thai Buddhist 
monastics work to cultivate experiential insight into the tenets of impermanence, 
suffering and non-self through meditative discipline. Trundle (2014) found that for 
the migrant charity givers in Italy she studied, empathy and compassion did not rest 
simply on processes of connection – on mimicry, transference and imagination, as 
many scholars has theorised. Rather crucial to their works was a recognition of 
disconnection, the boundaries that could not be crossed and a failure to appreciate the 
true nature of recipients’ suffering, that created the ethical, structural and affective 
drive to give. These initial conversations gave rise to a series of interconnected 
workshops and a conference on the theme of detachment, following our collective 
sense that similar issues seemed to find resonance in these diverse ethnographic 
contexts. This volume emerges as the culmination of these conversations and 
conferences.  
 
Thinking about detachment provides fresh entry points into a range of empirical 
contexts. But our aim here is more than simply collecting a set of vignettes. We wish 
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to put detachment center stage as a conceptual problem. Taking detachment seriously 
does not equate to rejection of relational theories and approaches. Nor does it entail  a 
nostalgic return to older analytics of pure distanced knowledge or solitary 
disconnected agents. Nor are we calling for a suspension of critical reflection on the 
potential dangers and limits of tropes and practices of detachment. What we are 
asking however, is that detachment be allowed the same ethnographic and conceptual 
air-time as its opposites. In so doing, the chapters in this volume bring to the 
foreground the many ways in which detachment and engagement are interwoven; the 
ways in which they limit, complement and enable each other. A focus on detachment 
forces us to ask ethnographic questions about the temporality of relations, their 
intensity, what makes them stick. Is each particular form of detachment a negation, a 
concealment, an interruption? And conversely, are relations forms that endure and 
cannot be purposefully unmade, like Umberto Eco’s persistent strands of memory 
(1988)? Are they vectors that pass, energies that must be continually channeled, or are 
they deciduous pledges whose maintenance requires daily care?  
 
Our aim in this book, in sum, is to bring detachment back to the forefront of 
theorizing in the social sciences and humanities. Our contention is that social theory 
has tended to naturalize the idea that relations are prior to the entities they connect. 
Questioning this understanding, we attempt to open-up an analytic vocabulary that 
allows for a more nuanced understanding of the terms in which entities are defined 
and related. Thus our approach entails an analytic leveling, proposing that neither 
relations nor entities come first (Candea 2010; Yarrow and Jones 2014) . We suggest 
that this provides a better platform from which to consider the ethnographic senses in 
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which people themselves afford ethical or epistemic priority to practices associated 
with relating and detaching 
 
The final section of this introduction returns to these questions through an attempt at a 
typology of detachments which will also serve as a guide to the chapters in the 
volume. First however, we will briefly trace the rise and fall of one particular 
modernist version of detachment, which has borne the brunt of academic and popular 
critique in recent years. This sets the scene for an attempt to recover detachment as an 
object of study beyond the resulting dichotomies. In the following section we will 
describe how our own approach builds on and extends the work of other scholars, 
who in different ways contribute to an understanding of detachment as a theoretical 
and empirical focus of enquiry.  
 
On Modernist Detachment and its critique 
 
A key argument of this book is that detachment comes in many shapes and sizes. 
However, one particular version of detachment has loomed over public and academic 
discourse in what is commonly known as ‘the West’ since at least the 19th century. 
Alternatively invoked as an unmitigated virtue or as an equally unmitigated sin, the 
spectre of ‘western modernist detachment’ has haunted public discourse and social 
theory and made it hard to think of detachment in any but the most dichotomous and 
morally charged terms. This section briefly reviews part of the story that leads this 
particular version of detachment to hold such a prominent place in social theory. 
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One key strand of the modernist ideal of detachment is epistemological and is 
frequently traced to the nineteenth century when, in a range of primarily European 
and American contexts, notions about the desirability of distanced perspectives 
became increasingly foundational to the pursuit of knowledge. The demarcation of 
science from other fields of human endeavor, and of scientific practitioners from 
politicians or the ‘common man’ was a long-drawn out process which saw its first 
significant episodes at least two centuries previously (e.g. Shapin and Schaffer 1985). 
However the 19
th
 century saw an intensification of this process as well as an 
increasing leeching out of discourses of scientific detachment into other realms. 
Daston and Galison (2007) have described how a range of previously distinct 
ideologies and dispositions were reconfigured as instances of a singular epistemic 
ideal of objectivity, entailing a particular understanding of the importance of 
detachment. Where scientific truth was located in relation to an objective bedrock 
reality, the subjectivity of the researcher became an obstacle to knowledge. Thus 
detachment became a central regulatory ideal, pertaining to the need for processes and 
dispositions to enable the management and separation of the individual scientist’s 
subjective emotions, feelings, and thoughts from the objective data that was produced. 
If in practice the ideal of objectivity took a range of forms, including ideas about the 
need for emotional detachment, automatic procedure and methods of quantification, 
these were configured during the middle of the nineteenth century as instances of a 
singular over-arching ideal. Such notions of scientific objectivity entailed a 
commitment to epistemic forms that necessitated distance from the world through 
specific forms of critical distance from oneself.  
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During this period, the bifurcation of notions of subjectivity and objectivity related to 
an increasing bifurcation between science and the arts as concerned with subjectivity 
and objectivity respectively. If subjectivity was a problem for the scientist in his or 
her pursuit of the detached knowledge constituted as a ‘view from nowhere’ (Daston 
and Galison 2007), it was, for the artist, a source of creativity to be cultivated and 
celebrated.  
 
The elaboration of a broader modernist/romantic split took in this key distinction, and 
read it through a range of attendant concerns about the rise of industry and 
estrangement from nature (Williams 1975), the modernizing drive of nationalism and 
the loss of regional folklore (McDonald 1989), the civilizing mission of Empire and 
the disappearing wisdom of the Other (Rabinow 1975; Said 1978; Stoler 2002). These 
and other versions of what Latour (1991) termed the Great Divide (between us and 
them, nature and culture, science and politics, heart and mind, etc.) profoundly 
marked the intellectual cast of the 19
th
 century, and left us with a set of linked 
dichotomies which persist to this day.  
 
Crucially, however, these dichotomies from which the obviousness of ‘modern 
detachment’ seem to emerge so clearly, are an effect of contemporary rhetorics, 
mediated by simplifying hindsight. A closer historical examination reveals a more 
complex set of patterns. Thus for instance, the bifurcation of subjectivity and 
objectivity did not map straightforwardly onto an opposition between engagement and 
detachment. Amanda Anderson (2001) notes how, during the same period, changes in 
literary writing also converged around a set of ideals that celebrated the detached 
viewpoint. For modernist writers, from the Victorian period onwards, the concern to 
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cultivate detached dispositions, took a range of forms, including the elimination of 
tendencies to judge and interpret, the suppression of the local and idiosyncratic in 
favour of the universal, the cultivation of realist forms of representation, and an 
aspiration to a version of literary truth that was grounded in critical distance from the 
writer’s own perspective. Victorian writers debated with competing ideals and virtues 
when considering what they identified as the power and limits of detachment; debates 
that were themselves constitutive of the project of modernity. Anderson demonstrates 
how George Eliot, John Stuart Mill, Charlotte Bronte, Charles Dickens, Matthew 
Arnold and Oscar Wilde all, in different ways, grapple with morally weighted 
understandings of detachment. Theirs was a distinctly modern preoccupation with the 
ambivalences and virtues of practices of detachment – the extent to which such 
practices might result in forms of distortion and insensitivity, or alternatively lead to 
desirable forms of cultivation and virtue. As an aspiration and ideal Victorian 
novelists played-off various forms of detachment against one another, casting some as 
progressive and liberating, while presenting others as dangerous and corrupting. Even 
for romantic critics such as Ruskin and Morris, faith in detachment understood as 
critical distance from one’s own perspective, sustained criticism of the debilitating 
and alienating effects of modern rationality particularly in the guise of modern 
industrial production.  
 
In literature as in science, then, modernist ideals of detachment arose in relation to a 
range of empirically very different practices, sustained as apparent instances of the 
same thing. Crucially, in relation to both scientific and literary practice, such ideals 
were subject to debate and critique which generally took a narrow rather than 
fundamental form: the scientist was critical of their own or others’ ability to sustain in 
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practice their own detachment from the world they observed, but did not question the 
ideal of detachment per se. Indeed the narrow critique (that this or that person was not 
sufficiently objective, or not in this instance) arose from and upheld a broader ideal 
(the epistemic importance of keeping subject and object distinct).  
 
Thus modernist ideals of detachment were, from the outset precariously achieved, 
internally contradictory and contested. However, contemporary (nineteenth century) 
critiques of this over-arching orientation participated in the elaboration of a master 
contrast between modernist detachment and romantic engagement which has 
solidified with hindsight. 
 
Crucially for our purposes, the rise of the social sciences was fundamental in the 
solidification of this association between modernity and detachment. In particular, 
nineteenth century sociology and anthropology, themselves in the process of 
detaching from cognate disciplines as proper stand-alone scientific fields (Durkheim 
1964 [1895]), contributed to the shoring up of such distinctions by their obsession 
with pinning down the essence of ‘modernity’. Thus evolutionary anthropologists 
traced, with Morgan, the progressive disengagement of the modern nuclear family 
from the web of primitive kinship, “by means of which [Man] raised himself from a 
state of promiscuous intercourse to final civilization” (Morgan 1870, 1877, Kuper 
2005), while Engels’ re-reading of this same narrative as one leading to the rise of 
private property and the state (Engels 1983 [1884]) fed into Marx’s philosophical-
historical documentation and lamentation of the multifaceted phenomenon of 
alienation. As the 19
th
 century gave way to the 20
th
, sociologists seeking to grasp the 
phenomenon of modernity circled around detachment with increasing inevitability: 
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from the rise of modern gesellschaft as against traditional gemeinschaft (Tönnies 1957 
[1887]), through the curse of modern anomie (Durkheim 1997 [1893]), Simmel’s 
(1976 [1903]) account of the adoption of a blasé attitude developed as a psychological 
defense mechanism against the sensual bombardments of modernity and metropolitan 
life, to Weber’s influential characterizations of modern bureaucracy and 
disenchantment (1978 [1922]). The association between modernity and detachment 
became a trope ripe for continual reinvention and re-elaboration. Foucault’s work on 
self-production and asceticism of modernity is one late instance: ‘To be modern is not 
to accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments; it is to take oneself as 
object of a complex and difficult elaboration’ (Foucault 1979: 166). Bruno Latour’s 
“We have never been modern” (1991), with its concern for the pairing of 
‘purification’ and ‘translation is another - to which we will return below, is another. 
 
Detachment dissolved 
 
“Just as we are a long way from drawing all the conclusions from the phrase 
“God is dead,” we are very far from understanding every implication of the 
phrase “The pure observer is dead.” (Sloterdjik 2012:17) 
 
In sum, the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries saw the increasing formalization of 
‘modernist detachment’, as an object of both celebration and critique –as both a 
highly valued ideal (for some) and as a condition of reality with which one had to 
contend.  
 
 10 
The novelty of the late 20
th
 century turn against detachment was not then the fact of 
its critique of modernist detachment as an ideal – late 20th century critics could draw 
(and often did) on a long tradition of romantic and other rejections of ideals of 
detachment. Rather, the novelty was the singleminded focus on documenting the 
inexistence and impossibility of modernist detachment. We find ourselves writing 
today in a conceptual atmosphere in which detachment is not so much critiqued as 
dissolved. This is an atmosphere in which it might seem, for instance, that “[t]here is 
no way to imagine a pure nature unmediated by politics” (Choy 2011:11, emphasis 
added). This type of restriction of the postmodern imagination is the phenomenon we 
are attempting to pinpoint in this section.  
 
If attempts to characterize ‘the literature’ are always problematically violent to its 
complexity (Mol 2002), then an attempt to characterize something as broad and 
shifting as ‘the current intellectual landscape in and beyond academia’ all the more 
so. Clearly what follows is a partial run through an incredibly complex field. 
Admittedly far from exhaustive, it is motivated by an effort to illustrate and define the 
ways in which detachment has been systematically – though far from completely – 
eclipsed as an empirical and conceptual focus. In the next section we will examine a 
number of authors who, writing against the grain, have been calling attention to 
detachment in different ways. But let us first try to sketch out what this ‘grain’ feels 
like. 
 
Whether one locates this shift in a post-colonial desire to highlight the connection 
between modern knowledge and colonial power, in post-structural impulse to 
deconstruct notions of textual autonomy and logocentric truth, or in the efforts of 
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feminists and queer theorists to re-introduce corporeal, gendered bodies as a locus of 
thought, a key trope of contemporary social theory which has now passed into dogma, 
is that purported detachment can and ought to be revealed as really relational, 
engaged, and entangled. The challenge to detachment emerged less in the form of a 
request to value engagement, and more in an authoritative demonstration that 
detachment is illusory. This related to an ethical call to recognize the fallacy of 
detachment  as a matter of both fact and principle.  
 
It would be unfair to suggest that this intellectual development was merely a matter of 
conceptual faddism. The suspicion of detachment had a number of serious and 
legitimate grounds. A number of events throughout the 20
th
 century had strenuously 
chipped away at the promise that a new age of scientific and technological progress, 
efficiency and development grounded in detached, ‘rational’ and ‘objective’ 
knowledge production. Two world wars demonstrated the destructive potential of new 
technological systems of killing. World War One and the new weaponry utilized saw 
over 5000 combat deaths a day, an almost ten fold increase on the last major 
European war, the Napoleonic Wars (Clodfelter 2002). The bureaucratically efficient 
means by which Jews and other minorities were exterminated in Nazi gas chambers 
revealed the difficulty in separating ‘rational’ scientific modes of human 
classification, chemistry, and the detached, dehumanizing division of labour that came 
to manage the killing of bodies in Nazi-occupied Europe. Moreover, the codes of 
human ethics that emerged within bioscience in the wake of the Nuremburg ‘Doctors’ 
Trial’ signaled a shifting morality of knowledge production, in which the detached 
pursuit of ‘pure’ scientific knowledge could no longer be divorced from the human 
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consequences, costs or benefits, and experiences of those experimentally involved or 
socially implicated (Pellegrino 1997). 
 
Correspondingly, the nuclear arms race, which saw the emergence of an entirely new 
spectre of global-wide destruction, dawned in August 1945 with the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the bomb’s cold-war wake, prominent scientists such as 
Einstein and Oppenheimer began to publicly question whether ongoing progress in 
nuclear physics was of benefit to humanity, suggesting that social decisions, ethical 
considerations, and political realities could and indeed should undergird scientific 
advancement in the future (Schweber 2008).  This marked the beginning of a shifting 
relationship between science and its publics, one that has become increasingly based 
on the principles of ‘engagement’, with many scientists now attempting to educate, 
consult with, inform and listen to public groups and ‘stakeholders’ (Porter et al. 
2013). 
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, the increasing concern with and visibility 
of science’s alignment to capitalism and industry gave a new language in which to 
express doubts about the detached nature of scientific discovery and truth. Industrial 
scientists had assured publics in many countries that products such as tobacco, lead 
and thalidomide were safe years after doubts began to arise of their human safety 
(Rosner 2013; Trundle, Singh and Broer 2014,). The chemico-nuclear disasters of 
Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Love Canal, Bhopal (and more recently Fukushima) all 
further served to undermine the trustworthiness of the industrial-regulatory-science 
nexus to impartially protect human health (Levine 1982; Walsh 1988, Das 1996; 
Petryna 2002). In such a context, social movements emerged in the 1970s and 1980s 
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seeking a more democratically engaged, partnership-based mode of involvement 
between publics, citizen groups, and those who governed them, and demanding to be 
actively involved in decisions regarding health investment, treatment, and testing 
(Kroll-Smith, Brown and Gunter 2000). Some groups, such as Deaf community 
advocates, gay rights groups, and mental health support groups, contested the very 
forms of disease categorization and the medicalization of disorder proposed by 
medical experts, declaring science to be inherently bound up with projects of cultural 
normalization (Conrad 2008). Meanwhile, environmentalism and ecology argued for 
more engaged scientific, social, political, economic and technological realms that 
could account for the ecological effects of human ways of life. “Ecology's critique of 
science and technology…suggests that ethical neutrality with respect to the results of 
scientific enterprise is not justified. The ecological position … challenges the idea that 
any form of human knowledge can be separated from its consequences” (Aronowitz 
1988: 21). 
 
As we noted above, the polysemy of detachment had enabled it to stand as an ideal for 
a diverse and even contradictory range of modernist projects. Unsurprisingly the same 
polysemy also enabled detachment to stand as a problematic Other for a similarly 
broad range of late-20
th
 century endeavours. Thus the social movements above were 
in complex and partial communication with critiques of detachment coming from 
radically different sources. New religious and spiritual movements offered followers 
new avenues for direct engagement, whether it was with God, society, politics, 
justice, or personal empowerment (Guitierrez 1988; Heelas 1992; Pfeiffer, Gimbel-
Sherr and Augusto 2008; Mair this volume).  
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In sum, the 20
th
 century was marked by the multiplication of historical contexts in 
which  a range of troubling ideologies and practices were found lying beneath claims 
to epistemic distance and detachment. It is against this background and interwoven 
with it, that pointed critiques across a broad spectrum of theories and contexts have 
sought to show the illusory nature of the very idea of detachment, suggesting the de 
facto impossibility of sustaining disconnection from one’s own subjectivity and self-
interest. Thus, radical feminist thinkers pointed out that the methods of objectivity 
and detachment driving systems of power, politics, bureaucracy, scientific knowledge 
and capitalist developments were obscuring a culturally and historically constituted 
patriarchy that in fact gave such systems their legitimacy. Building on this critique to 
propose a feminist method of knowledge production, Donna Haraway famously 
argued for a mode of thought that “does not pretend to disengagement: to be from 
everywhere and so nowhere, to be free from interpretation, from being represented, to 
[be] fully self contained or fully formalizable. Rational knowledge is a process of 
ongoing critical interpretation between fields of interpreters and decoders. Rational 
knowledge is a power-sensitive conversation” (ibid).  
 
 From this perspective the political implications of modernist claims to detachment 
have been spelt out from a range of theoretical and disciplinary perspectives and in 
relation to diverse substantive contexts. The technical detachment of development 
agencies has been revealed as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1994), constituting 
‘the third world’ as an object of intervention the Europeans claim to know precisely in 
their distance from it (Esteva 1992; Hobart 1993; Crush 1995). Deconstructive 
approaches likewise sought to question detached claims to historical truth, and the 
universalising objectivised visions of ‘heritage’, foregrounding the inherent relativity 
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of all interpretation, and hence the ‘illusory’ nature of elite claims to know the past 
(Lowenthal 1985; Smith 2006). Challenging the seeming self-evidence of human 
exceptionalism, post-humanist scholars uncovered the practical and conceptual 
technologies which allow clear distinctions to be made (and to be taken for granted) 
between humans and other animals – chief amongst them the contention that humans 
have no ‘objective’ access to animal minds (Haraway 1997; Crist 2002; Milton 2005; 
Despret 2004 – see Candea 2013).  
 
Recent celebratory orientations to the concept of ‘engagement’, likewise invest the 
term with a broader explanatory value and in part draws its force from the versions of 
modernist detachment it is imagined to negate. For example, in a recent discussion the 
sociologist and philosopher Richard Sennett suggests that ‘The craftsman represents 
the special human condition of being engaged’ (Sennett 2009: 20). Elaborating how 
craft practice engenders an ongoing dialogue between people and materials, he 
suggests that these expose the limits of Cartesian distinctions between mind and 
world, thinking and doing. Likewise, when Ingold (2000) discusses skilled practice as 
a process that indissolubly engages people, materials, tools and environments, the 
wider theoretical significance of the insight lies in its negation of modernist forms of 
detachment, including between mind and body, organism and world. While such 
Cartesian understandings start ‘from the postulate of an original detachment of the 
intelligent subject, who has then to construct (or reconstruct) the world in his or her 
mind, prior to bodily engagement with it’, (2001: 417) his own discussion works as a 
reversal of this logic: ‘postulating an original condition of engagement, of being in the 
world, we suppose that the practitioner has then to detach himself from the current of 
his activity in order to reflect upon it.'' (417).  
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In social scientific methodology itself, the detachment between observer and observed 
came strongly under attack, from those who sought to make explicit the political 
implications of this methodological and theoretical framing, and to foreground the 
relativity of academics’ own claims to know (Said 1978, Fabian 1980, Clifford and 
Marcus 1986). A tactic of “epistemological collapse” relying on experimental writing 
which revoked the distance between theory and ethnography, informant and 
anthropologist, was one of the immediate responses to this crisis (Munasinghe 
2006:179). But as Munasinghe notes, the crisis of representation primarily resulted in 
an entanglement between ‘data and ‘theory’ within academic discourse (ibid). A far 
more potent challenge came with the realization that social scientific concepts (such 
as nation, society, or culture…) circulated and did important work in the world social 
scientists were seeking to describe (Ibid, 174). Detachment increasingly seemed not 
simply unpalateable, but impossible. As Annelise Riles astutely observes: 
 
“a once productive distance ethnographers maintained, implicitly or explicitly, 
purposefully or not, between ourselves and our objects of our study, between 
the things studied (the data) and the frames we used to study them (the 
analysis), between theorizing and describing, has now definitively collapsed.” 
(Riles 2006:3) 
 
Interwoven in complex ways with these conceptual and historical developments in the 
second half of the twentieth century was a rising language of ‘accountability’. Such a 
language demanded a more ‘engaged’ approach from organizations, businesses and 
government, an approach which ideally could meet the needs of ‘clients’, ‘customers’, 
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‘citizens’ and ‘consumers’ in ways that previously detached modes of bureaucratic or 
economic action had failed to deliver (du Gay 2000). Blending the language of 
neoliberal capitalism, New Management, and democratic ideals, new norms of 
‘responsiveness’ emerged within public sectors, policy spheres and economic life 
(Strathern 2000, Shore 2008). These new approaches demanded of organisations 
regular inspections, target-setting, a focus on outcomes, new systems of audit, and the 
increased recognition and role of ‘users’ in organisational action. In Britain, for 
example, Tony Blair (Prime Minster from 1997-2007) sought to legislatively 
encourage more direct citizen participation in service provisions in the early 2000s 
(Taylor and Kelly 2006). 
 
In parallel technological developments in media and communication have served to 
foster what is commonly deemed more participatory, engaged modes by which 
information and knowledge can circulate, be shared, and be constructed, and a more 
participatory mode of virtual democratic life (e.g. Shirky 2009). Collaborative 
knowledge building tools such as Wikipedia, the emergence of comments sections on 
news sites through which readers engage and add their opinions and experiences, 
crowdfunding websites, web protest campaigns, and internet groups formed around 
common interests or perspectives, have all decentered previously seemingly detached 
authorities of knowledge, power and production. Such an approach to knowledge is 
also visible within the sphere of education in which there is now a push away from 
longstanding methods of knowledge transmission towards new modes of ‘active 
learning’, engaged teaching methods, and learning outside the ‘disconnected’ 
classroom and within ‘real life’, such as the growth of internships and work-based or 
community service learning methods (Beck and Maida 2013). Sociologist Frank 
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Furedi suggests that as relativistic understandings of truth have increasingly 
undermined the authority of higher education academics take refuge in attempts to 
appear 'relevant', 'accessible' and 'in touch' with popular opinion. (Furedi 2004). In 
sum, technological shifts at the end of the 20
th
 century both underwrote the seeming 
obviousness of metaphors of connectivity, and enabled new practices of connection. 
 
Correspondingly, the ‘cultural turn’ has coincided with the valorisation of connection, 
relationship and engagement as analytic frameworks for thinking about ethics and 
knowledge production in the humanities and social sciences. Marilyn Strathern (2014) 
has recently commented on an intensification of interest in relations in social 
anthropology, suggesting that this in part responds to the collapse of analytic faith in 
the systems and structures once thought to contain them (‘culture’, ‘society’ and the 
like). No longer as specific, concrete instances of these social, cultural or economic 
processes, relations appear as prime movers of sociality in their own right. She notes 
that, at least in this abstract form, ‘the concept of relation often seems to carry a 
positive value. By and large, it is a good thing to have found them!’ (ibid).  
 
In sum what we are arguing is that, a profound but largely imperceptible shift took 
place in broad swathes of popular and academic discourse in the latter half of the 20
th
 
century. While an earlier sense of a loaded alternative between engagement and 
detachment persisted as rhetorics, the moral universe this harked back to in 19
th
 and 
20
th
 century Europe and America had quietly given way to a more radical sense that 
relationship and engagement, for better or worse, are all there is. Ethical and 
intellectual dilemmas were increasingly posed not so much about relations, but within 
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them. Detachment, it seemed, was increasingly if not exclusively conceivable only as 
a quality encompassed by and hence secondary to the logic of relations.  
 
Reconsidering detachment 
 
As we noted at the opening of the previous section, the whirlwind tour above is not 
offered as a final diagnostic. Rather it is an impressionistic illustration of our sense 
that we find ourselves writing in a conceptual moment which is overdetermined by 
the priority of the relational over the non-relational on simultaneously epistemic, 
ethical and ontological planes. In proposing this diagnosis, we are unambiguously not 
dismissing legitimate concerns about the politics and ethics of detachment in 
particular contexts; nor are we calling for the ‘ruination’ (Navaro-Yashin 2009) of the 
many and varied theoretical approaches touched on above. We are simply mapping 
the increasing restriction of the conceptual and ethnographic space allowed for the 
study of detachment as an actual or potential phenomenon.  
There are signs, however, that we may be experiencing a more widespread 
dissatisfaction with this relationalist narrowing of the frame. Thus, in recent years, 
other versions of the above narrative have emerged, painted on different temporal and 
disciplinary canvases  – see for instance Meillassoux’s critique of ‘correlationism’ in 
philosophy since Kant (2008), Sloterdijk’s investigation into the conceptual ‘murder’ 
of the detached subject of knowledge (2012 – see Robbins, this volume) or Albert 
Piette’s concerned letter to anthropologists “Against Relationalism” (2014; on Piette’s 
earlier work on ‘the minor mode’ which prefigures some of these concerns, see 
Humphrey, this volume). Each of these, rather like our own account above, takes the 
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form of a sweeping review, by nature leaving some things out, collapsing crucial 
distinctions, but articulating a central sense that something has been lost. 
 
While these diagnoses have appeared largely in parallel to our own, there are a 
number of authors whose work fed more directly into our initial elaboration of this 
project. As in the previous section, we cannot possibly list here – let alone give a 
satisfactory account of) – all the various works which have in various ways acted as a 
catalyst for this project
2
. We will have to strategically narrow our sights to two key 
approaches which are particularly clearly represented in the chapters that follow. The 
first was the turn to ethics, both in anthropology (e.g. Laidlaw 2002, 2013, Lambek 
2010, Faubion 2011), and in other disciplines (Daston and Galison 2007, Anderson 
2001). The influence here was simultaneously ethnographic, methodological and 
theoretical. It is not simply that anthropologists and historians interested in ethics and 
self-formation had, as a matter of course, studied people who aimed at certain forms 
of detachment (from the world or from themselves). Just as important was the fact 
that in the process, they had begun to call more or less explicitly for a moratorium on 
a certain version of the critical reflex seemed to reduce people’s own accounts of 
what they were doing, to a kind of false-consciousness to (see for instance Laidlaw 
2002 on the limits of anthropological accounts of ‘agency’; Daston and Galison on the 
need to suspend critique in order to take seriously objectivity as an ethical goal 2007).  
 
Amanda Anderson (2001), writing in a similar vein, has warned against the scholarly 
pitfall theorizing detachment as an ‘either/or’. Practices in cultivated distance that 
claim a pure or completed objectivity are, she argues, evidence of a frustrated 
idealism, the counter argument to which is that no such absolute detachment, whether 
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it be in objectivity, separation or distance, is ever truly achievable. In her own words, 
such ‘critics show themselves unable to imagine critical distance as a temporary 
vantage, unstable achievement, or regulative ideal: it’s all or nothing’ (Anderson 
2001: 32). Her critique of both scholarly trends is that they miss the ways in which 
detachment may be important for people as a practice or as an intention. This interest 
in ethics, which runs strongly through a number of the contributions to this volume, is 
one way of getting at the crucial distinction between detachment as ideology and 
detachment as perfectible – and thus ethnographically accessible – practice.  
 
The second conceptual tradition to which we are strongly indebted has its roots in the 
anthropology of kinship – a field which through its many incarnations and 
reconfigurations, has always been centrally concerned with the documentation of 
connections and disconnections. A recent instance can be found in Rupert Stasch’s 
exquisitely detailed ethnography of the Korowai, which, informed by the classic 
sociology of Simmel as much as by the recent musings on alterity of anthropologists 
such as Viveiros De Castro, brings to the foreground the otherness which lies at the 
heart of kinship and social relations for the Korowai (Stasch 2009). But the line of 
analysis which most directly informed our own work was the distinctive 
recombination of thinking about kinship and knowledge associated with the work of 
Marilyn Strathern.  
 
Strathern’s work is often portrayed – perhaps not unfairly – as belonging squarely to 
the relational turn of the late 20
th
 century which we have sketched in the previous 
section; it is to her work after all, that anthropology owes one of the most far-reaching 
articulations of the relationality of persons, for instance (1988). However, Strathern’s 
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work simultaneously and recursively brought ‘the relation’ itself into ethnographic 
focus as a particular artifact of Euroamerican knowledge-making (1992; 1995; 1996). 
Making the relation visible in this way, bringing it into the foreground, necessarily 
raises the question of what the background might be. It is thus not coincidental that 
Strathern is one of the anthropologists who has most thematised the effects of 
division, cuts, breaks and negative strategies – from the anthropological tactics of 
comparison, contextualization and ‘bifurcation’ (1987; 2004) through to indigenous 
forms such as Melanesian dividuality (1988) or Euroamerican concerns with cutting 
endless networks through claims of ownership (cutting the network). In this way, 
arguably, Strathern’s work already prefigures the moment which some have recently 
sought to characterize as ‘post-relational’ (Pedersen 2013). Strathernian relations are, 
in a manner of speaking, connections that cut themselves. Across multiple contexts 
and arguments, the point of her analysis was not to celebrate relativity and 
connection, but to open up a conceptual space in which connections and 
disconnections could be traced, according to the logic of different ethnographic 
circumstances.  
 
In this connection, it is worth reading Strathern alongside and in contrast to another 
theorist who looms large over our thinking and over many of the chapters in this 
book, namely Bruno Latour. Self-consciously seeking to supersede the post-modern 
critique outlined in the previous section, Bruno Latour’s influential ‘We have never 
been modern’ (1991) put connections and disconnections on an even keel – almost. 
Latour argued that modernist attempts to detach, cut, disentangle and ‘purify’ (nature 
from culture, humans from non-humans, Them from Us, science from politics, and so 
on.) were only possible because of the increasing accumulation of ‘translations’ 
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between these different realms, making hybrids, quasi-objects and networks 
proliferate: that is the strength of what Latour terms the ‘Modern Constitution’. 
Insofar as it resists the temptation to reveal practices of engagement and translation as 
the real underpinning and of detachment and purification as mere illusion or false 
consciousness (1991:40), but rather treats both moves as empirically real, Latour’s 
symmetric anthropology nearly manages to put the two on an even footing. Indeed a 
number of the contributors to the present volume draw inspiration from his analyses 
in this respect. However, in the end, we would argue (pace for instance Jensen and 
Winthereik, this volume) that the Latourian argument implies an analytic asymmetry 
in its orientation to practices of relating and of separating. While Latour puts relating 
and separating on the same analytical plane, this is itself an act of relation. 
Purification and translation are both real moves, yes, but the cardinal sin of the 
moderns was to keep the two moves separate, whereas the duty of the ‘amodern’ 
analyst is to relate them.  
 
“If we understand modernity in terms of the official Constitution that has to 
make a total distinction between humans and nonhumans on the one hand and 
between purification and mediation on the other, then no anthropology of the 
modern world is possible. But if we link together in one single picture the work 
of purification and the work of mediation that gives it meaning, we discover, 
retrospectively that we have never been modern.” (1991:91, emphasis added) 
 
Both Latour and Strathern’s work inhabit a space on the edge of the relational: both 
point to the ways in which disconnection, cuts and distinctions, accompany, 
undergird, permit or arise from relations and connections. Unlike Latour, however, 
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whose own language and method is itself thoroughly relational (and the rhetorical 
indebtedness of Actor-Network Theory to the language of accountability is telling – 
cf Latour 2005), Strathern cleaved heuristically to the classic anthropological form of 
the contrastive comparison, the erection of radical distinctions between Them and Us 
(see Candea 2010; Tsing 2010). While Latour ultimately trumped his recognition of 
disconnections through a relational method
3, Strathern’s work (1996) can be seen as 
establishing a real and effective symmetry between the two: every cut is revealed as 
also a relation, every relation is also a disengagement from something else.  
 
These two broad sources of theoretical insight – the anthropology of ethics and 
Strathern’s work on the relation – were diversely influential on the four of us, and on 
the contributors to this volume. They are, it has to be said, uneasy companions and 
point, often implicitly rather than explicitly, to a very different range and type of 
disconnections, detachments and cuts. We will return to some of the tensions between 
them, which inhabit a number of the chapters in this volume, in the next section.  
What both have in common with each other and with our project, however, is the 
more general anthropological concern with the primacy of the ethnographic. This 
similarity of commitment (take your ethnography seriously), and multiplicity of 
substantive meanings and implications of ‘detachment’, influenced the form of our 
initial call to arms: ‘take detachment seriously as an ethnographic object (whatever it 
might turn out to be)!’.  
 
Given how indebted the relational turn has been to the rejection and mistrust of the 
relatively ill-defined, or at least shifting, target of ‘modernist detachment’, this open-
ended strategy has proved to be extremely productive. Paying close ethnographic 
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attention to specific instances of detachment (both nominally ‘modernist’ and ‘non-
modernist’) necessarily explodes the monolithic image of the ‘failed ideal’ of 
modernist detachment. Ethnography does this both by highlighting the situated and 
multiple nature of the ideal, and by locating this alongside other ways of living and 
valuing detachment. 
  
What is detachment? A typology  
 
There are some limits to this purely ethnographic strategy however. Shortly after the 
conference from which most of the chapters in this volume are drawn, one of the 
audience members, philosopher Hallvard Lillehammer, forwarded a somewhat 
tongue-in cheek list he had compiled of 6o different ways in which detachment had 
been invoked by participants (see below). The friendly rebuke embedded in this 
Borgesian catalogue was clear: detachment as we were using it, could be anything and 
everything. Stolidly, one of us replied that where the philosopher saw a failure to 
define one’s key analytical category, the anthropologist saw the result of a successful 
campaign to turn detachment into an ethnographic category. Focusing attention on 
detachment in this sense will quite naturally result in the multiplication of instances, 
and in the concomitant stretching and reconfiguring of the categorical starting point. 
 
 
1.Detachment as objectivity   
2.Detachmment as impartiality   
3.Detachment as explanatory 
reductionism   
4.Detachment as 
disinterestedness   
5.Detachment as lack of 
prejudice 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6.Detachment as ‘blinding’ (in 
‘blind trials’)   
7.Detachment as technology-
mindedness   
8.Detachment as high-
mindedness (remoteness from 
everyday life)   
9.Detachment as refusal to be 
co-opted   
10.Detachmment as ethos of 
bureaucratic office/personality   
11.Detachment as removal of 
parts from a whole where other parts 
stay in place   
12.Detachment as interest 
created by ‘external’ incentives (e.g. 
research funding)   
13. Detachment as not caring   
14.Detachment as bracketing an 
issue or analysis to avoid openness to 
criticism   
15.Detachment as the closing off 
of/turning away from something in 
pursuit of an end   
16.Detachment as a 
pathology/disorder (e.g. social 
phobia)   
17.Detachment as a bulwark 
against moral zealotry and managerial 
enthusiasm   
18.Detachment as inter- 
patience/disengaged participation (the 
integrated, but non-interfering 
observer)   
19.Detachment as forgetting   
20.Detachment as non-
differentiation   
21.Detachment as industrial 
mechanization   
22.Detachment as distancing   
23.Detachment as 
autonomy/freedom 
24.Detachment as 
cognition/judgement (as opposed to 
affect)   
25.Detachment as 
invisibility/absence   
26.Detachment as 
untouchability 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27.Detachment as excess of 
scale for being intuitively grasped   
28.Detachment as rationality   
29.Detachment as 
division/separation (e.g. of soul from 
body)   
30.Detachment as 
exclusion/expulsion   
31.Detachment as 
disgust/repugnance   
32.Detachment as removal from 
public view   
33.Detachment as mediation   
34.Detachment as separation 
(e.g. of property)   
35.Detachment as 
discipline/order/security   
36.Detachment as abstraction 
(e.g. of concepts)   
37.Detachment as a sign of the 
sacred   
38.Detachment as disbelief   
39.Detachment as observation   
40.Detachment as death   
41.Detachment as safe distance 
(e.g. from spirits)   
42.Detachment as the untying of 
a knot   
43.Detachment as 
sacrifice/giving up something   
44.Detachment as using a 
substitute rather than the real thing   
45.Detachment as balancing   
46.Detachment as oppression   
47.Detachmment as liberation 
through confession   
48.Detachment as irony   
49.Detachment as spiritual 
renunciation   
50.Detachment as anti-spiritual 
renunciation (e.g. cutting off from 
religious practices)   
51.Detachment as 
meditation/prayer   
52.Detachment as equanimity   
53.Detachment as living without 
property (’the carefree life’)   
54.Detachment as freedom from 
strain/having a balanced mind 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55.Detachment as seeing without 
acting   
56.Detachment as fasting to 
death   
57.’External’ detachment: NOT 
[A is related to B]   
58.’Internal’ detachment: A is 
[NOT related to B]   
59. Stronger, third, reading: A is 
related to [NOT B]   
60.Detachment as mutual 
accommodation/co-operation. 
 
Lillehammer, Pers. Comm. 
 
A popular anthropological tradition would urge us to stop there, to rest content with 
the act of documenting the empirical multiplicity and ubiquity of detachment. But our 
aim is also, more profoundly, to highlight the ways in which, as conceptual 
abstractions, the foundational status of the terms sociality, relationality and 
engagement naturalises a relational view of the world that then acts to render 
detachment as a specific and secondary quality.  
In that context, leaving ‘detachment’ as a general placeholder that could mean 
anything and everything creates a kind of analytical collapse. At this level of 
abstraction it is rather easy to conclude that detachment itself is ‘just another relation’. 
The smoothness of this seemingly obvious conclusion flattens crucial ethnographic 
differences and also masks the fact that in the process, relations have once again been 
naturalized as the ‘real’ ground of reality. To make conceptual space for detachment, 
to give it analytical purchase, requires that we descend from this level of abstraction 
to something like a typology of kinds of detachment. 
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Any such typology necessarily entails a simplification of the ethnographic realities it 
describes. But typology is much like other kinds of detachment: it would be absurd to 
reject it completely just because it cannot be perfect. In response to Lillehammer’s 
provocation, we espouse typology in this section, not as a revelation of a fixed 
underlying order, or as a place to rest, but as an ongoing perfectible practice.  
 
Drawing on the classic structuralist technique of the table of crossed binaries (see 
table 1), we could begin by highlighting two fundamental distinctions cut across 
invocations of detachment in the chapters that follow. The first is the distinction 
between completed detachment (detachment as a state) and ongoing detachment 
(detachment as a process or activity). The second is the distinction between accounts 
which are in the first person (detachment from the actor’s point of view) and those 
given from a third party perspective (detachment between any two entities described 
‘from the outside’).  
 
The distinction between state and process is fairly straightforward. In some cases 
detachment is something which is being done. We see this as a cutting or a drawing 
away, as when organs are detached from a body, as in Maryon McDonald’s chapter 
on surgeons and anatomy classes, or the separation between producers and their 
product, as in Hannah Knox and Penny Harvey’s chapter on Engineers in Peru. It is 
also visible in the disconnections drawn between humans and the animals they tend, 
as exemplified in Kim Crowder’s chapter on British pig farmers, or in the reflective 
distance created between persons and their own thoughts, illustrated in Joanna Cook’s 
chapter on mindfulness therapy in Britain.  
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In other cases detachment is a state in which a thing or person finds itself as the 
outcome of such a process: a state of being unattached to some other thing or person, 
as in the detachment of the person from the office within new systems of university 
audit culture, as Corsin-Jimenez described in his chapter, a chapter that seeks 
conceptual purchase from juxtaposing varied forms of interface and effect, from 
Baroque aesthetics, to digital software and modern university life. Or, as in Casper 
Jensen and Brit Winthereik’s chapter, which examines an international development 
project in Vietnam aimed at building a long house and micro-enterprises, in which the 
local ‘community’, the project and the aid workers find themselves detached from 
each other in various ways. 
 
One of the questions which runs through a number of these papers is precisely what 
the relation if any between state and process might be: is a stable state ever achievable 
(and if so for how long?), or is detachment necessarily an ongoing (and thus ever-
incomplete) process? And if the latter, is detachment as a stable state then to be 
understood as a fiction of which the process is the real counterpart, or is it an ideal 
which enables and is constitutive of the process?
4
.  
 
This last question brings us straight to the second distinction, which cuts across the 
one above, between first-person and third-party descriptions. Speaking of detachment 
as a process or a state commits us to saying very little about the entities involved. 
Both states and processes of detachment can be predicated to any entity on any scale, 
and they can happen both within and between entities. In these pages we find 
detached (state) or detaching (process) knowledges (Corsin-Jimenez), roads (Knox 
and Harvey), communities, fieldsites and houses (Jensen and Winthereik), body parts 
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(McDonald), beliefs and relationships (Robbins), as well as of course human persons. 
These various descriptions of detachments (and relations) within and between entities 
we are referring to as third-party descriptions. Insofar as none of the chapters focus 
solely on the author’s own detachment from their material (although a number of the 
papers do touch on this theme), all of them include ‘third-party’ accounts of 
detachment in this sense.  
 
So what is meant by first-person detachment? A number of our contributors are 
concerned with investigating detachment in a specific sense which, as we noted 
above, owes much to the anthropology of ethics, namely as a subject of reflexive 
commitment or ongoing conscious practice by human persons. This is what we would 
call ‘first-person’ detachment. Detachment, in this first-person sense, is not simply a 
state of non-connection that any entity might be in, but a stance or a perspective on 
one’s own action. This is clearest perhaps in Caroline Humphrey’s chapter on 
Mongolian weddings, in which wedding leaders maintain a stance of “active 
detachment” from their own subject position, and who can oscillate back and forth 
between the bride and groom groups’ vantage points through rituals and songs.  
Correspondingly, Joel Robbins’ chapter reflects on how a Christian ethos of 
detachment might offer anthropologists studying Christianity a technique through 
which to overcome distance and recognize shared commitments with their 
participants.   
 
 
Whether or not a detached stance is considered to be possible or only desired or 
hoped-for, it is clearly the ‘first-person’ equivalent of what we have described above 
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as a state. By contrast, the first-person equivalent of detachment as process is that 
staple of the anthropology of ethics: self-conscious perfectible practice, or to put it 
more simply and with a nod to Foucault, an ascetic. In sum, we could map these two 
crossed binaries as in table 1.  
 
 Third-party First-person 
Completed Detachment as 
State 
Detachment as 
Stance 
Ongoing Detachment as 
Process 
Detachment as 
Ascetic 
 
Added to these distinctions, two of our contributors, James Laidlaw and 
Jonathan Mair, draw their own typology of detachment, both inspired in slightly 
different ways by the work of Jon Elster. In relation to North Indian Jainism and Inner 
Mongolian Buddhism respectively, they draw a distinction between internal and 
external detachment, modeled on Elster’s Hegelian distinction between internal and 
external negation. Internal and external here des not refer to perspective as in the 
distinction between third-party and first person, but rather to the logical relation 
between terms. In Laidlaw’s rendition, external detachment is the thinly specified 
negation of any kind of relation between two terms – “Not (A is related to B)”, 
whereas internal detachment marks the more thickly specified state of being in a non-
relation – “A is not-related to B”. If the former merely indexes an absence of relation, 
specifying only the terms which are not supposed to be related, in the latter case, the 
substance of what it means to be ‘not-related’ matters: detachment becomes fleshed 
out as a particular kind of attitude or stance, and gains particular ethical substance and 
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positive content. To this, Laidlaw adds a third, more radical possibility of 
‘intransitive’ detachment, where no term B is specified – A is simply not related, even 
to A.  
 
This distinction cuts across our four-part scheme to interesting effect. Thus, with our 
earlier distinctions in mind, it is notable that the ethnographic instance of this radical 
detachment in Laidlaw’s text is presented as the intended outcome of a process (of 
fasting to death). In other words, as a state (let alone as a stance), as Laidlaw makes 
clear, intransitive detachment would be unsustainable by living beings – as an object 
of ascesis, however, it becomes fully understandable.  
 
In Laidlaw’s work these three types of detachment are all in what we have termed the 
first-person mode (as stance or ascetic): they are distinctions drawn between the 
different ethical content of different kinds of non-relations between persons, and they 
come with specific interactional and affective valences which Laidlaw describes in 
vibrant detail. However, one might map this distinction on third-party detachments 
which require less specific ethical content. It is hard to imagine, by contrast, what 
‘intransitive’ detachment as a state would look like ‘ethnographically’ – this requires 
rather a metaphysical postulate.  
 
This work of typologising reveals what a cursory read might perhaps obscure: the 
often profoundly different logics at stake in the following discussions of detachment. 
The third-party/first person distinction points to an important fork in the road, which 
we also mentioned above. Writing of detachment as a stance or as an ascetic relies 
implicitly or explicitly on the distinctiveness of an account focused on human persons 
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with an ability to take a perspective, and with characteristics such as intentionality 
and reflexivity – what one might call, loosely, a humanist approach. By contrast, 
third-party accounts of detachment as a state or process allows an agnostic account 
which, while it can easily recoup the internalist account above, can also significantly 
challenge its underpinnings. For instance, a number of our contributors (Jensen and 
Winthereik, Corsin-Jimenez, Knox and Harvey) write in communication with 
analytical traditions such as Actor-Network Theory, or the anthropology of partible 
personhood, which aim precisely to craft a language of analysis which troubles the 
humanist distinction between persons and things. More profoundly, both of these 
traditions, in different ways, seek to evade the very distinction between internal and 
external relations, challenging accounts of a world made up of stable entities which 
then relate to one another. This does not sit neatly with accounts of detachment for 
which the primacy and distinctiveness of the human subject is a prerequisite. 
 
Some of the most exciting work in this collection, however, lies precisely at the cross-
roads between detachment as process, state, stance and ascetic, such as when personal 
aspirations to detachment are worked through practices of material cutting and 
separation (McDonald, Crowder this volume, see also Yarrow and Jones 2014, 
Candea 2010), or when ascesis requires the operation of detachments and cuts within 
the person, such as a distance from one’s own thoughts and emotional reactions, as in 
Cook’s chapter, or when third-party-accounts in an actor-network theory vein become 
in turn the medium for the analysts’ own reflection on detachment (Jensen and 
Winthereik).  
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Another important fork in the road concerns what now emerge as a number of 
potential interpretations of this volume’s central call to reconsider detachment as a 
real phenomenon to be taken seriously, by opposition to detachment as an often 
illusory or ideological ‘stable state’ – the classic focus of critiques of objectivity, as 
we have noted above. There are two potential arguments entwined here and it matters 
which alternative one chooses. For to argue that entities are never fully detached 
(state) but are detaching (process) is not always the same as arguing that persons are 
not detached in any ultimate sense (state), but that they sincerely wish, hope or 
commit to being so (stance). In some cases (scientific objectivity seems a case in 
point) a detached stance is an impossible, or at least fleeting and always partial 
achievement, however continuous one’s ascesis. In others it is a fairly unproblematic 
structural position one occupies without seemingly much need for ascesis at all 
(Humphrey). Sometimes, the first-person ascesis of detachment might rely on 
processes which ‘from the outside’ are profoundly relational (Cook 2008). Or 
conversely, as with classic discussions of romantic attitudes to the countryside 
amongst an increasingly urbanized population (Williams 1975), a profoundly engaged 
stance might be premised precisely on being in an increasingly detached state.  
 
In sum, this very tentative typological exercise begins to outline the answer to the two 
challenges we started from in this section. First, the challenge that detachment means 
anything and everything. Without letting go of the generative multiplicity of 
ethnographic contexts and situations, we have identified some points of tension and 
key questions around which accounts of detachment coalesce, and a number of 
regularities in the way detachment is invoked in the papers that follow. As for the 
second, and more serious challenge, that detachment is just another kind of relation? 
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Once there are kinds of detachment and kinds of relation
5
, the statement begins to call 
for specification and loses its neat reductive structure. This simultaneously opens up 
new lines of empirical enquiry and requires and facilitates new conceptual 
experiments. 
 
Organization of the book 
 
This book is organized into three sections: professionalism and expertise, ritual and 
religion, and detaching and situating knowledge. These are of course not the only 
areas of contemporary life in which practices of detachment are ethnographically 
present and analytically interesting. Collectively, however, they cover a wide range of 
practices of detachment, and offer us a window into key areas of human action in 
which detachment is particularly good to think with, both for the interlocutors of these 
studies and for the anthropologists who study them.  
 
The first section on professionalism and expertise focuses on three different types of 
experts – pig farmers, road engineers, and medical students and transplant surgeons –
in order to examine how detachment operates to both enable and curtail action, 
relationality, ethics, and the production of knowledge. The road engineers in Peru to 
whom Hannah Knox and Penny Harvey introduce us utilize varied modes of 
detachment – with local people, with natural materials, with politics and with the 
project – in order to enact the role of a responsible and responsive expert. The pigmen 
described by Kim Crowder use a praxis of detachment in order to foster and cut 
relations and affective connections with animals who must be vitally sustained and 
cared for, and then killed and commodified. Meanwhile, Maryon McDonald 
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introduces us to the world of medical students who dissect bodies, and surgeons who 
transplant organs.  Here detachment is both a fleshy task of cutting and recomposing 
bodies, and an uneasy ethical and emotional stance that requires careful negotiation, 
cultivation and sometimes negation. As Veena Das points out in her commentary for 
this section, the fragility of death, vulnerability, sacrifice and ‘the finitude of human 
existence’ are ever-present here, challenging assumptions that detachment is simply a 
stance of cold disinterest.  
 
Section Two takes us to the realms of ritual and religion. Here Joel Robbins 
juxtaposes two interrelated dilemmas, one epistemological and one ethnographic, that 
locate an ethos of detachment within Christianity. Just as an anthropologist studying 
Christianity must deal with the question of his or her own dis/belief and its impact on 
‘being in the field’, the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea, in converting to charismatic 
Christianity, must detach from, but also manage, relations with natural spirits.  James 
Laidlaw shifts our ethnographic focus to Shvetambar Jainism in north India, 
demonstrating how, through annual rituals, alms-giving and fasting practices, diverse 
types of detachment are achieved based on internal or external modes of negation. In 
Mongolian Buriads wedding rituals Caroline Humphrey argues that detachment 
should not be equated with separation (a connection broken), but in this case implies a 
strategic and cultivated ‘third ‘place’, a distancing from any…situated perspectives’. 
Michael Carrithers offers a commentary of the three chapters that reflects on the 
detached stance of the writers as scholars, and then reflects these insights back to the 
ethnographic world of Buriads, Jains and Pentecostals.      
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In section three we turn to practices of knowledge. Alberto Corsín Jiménez takes a 
17
th
 century painting by Velázquez, an artist who pioneered a new mode of re-
description relying upon forms of suspension, displacement and detachment. Corsín 
Jiménez then juxtaposes these insights onto an analysis of modern forms of audit, 
bureaucracy and digital life in order to locate baroque modes of displacements or 
enhancements. Casper Bruun Jensen and Brit Ross Winthereik reflect upon an 
ecotourism development project in Vietnam, asking what an actor network theory 
approach to detachment might reveal. They show how detachment and engagement 
are entangled, that ‘they transform over time and emerge in new constellations’. 
Joanna Cook’s chapter ethnographically charts the practices associated with 
Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy in Britain. Here detachment emerges as a 
double figure: both a troubling mental affliction associated with the ills of modern 
life, and simultaneously as a solution to the above, cultivated as an internal ethos 
designed to foster healthy modes of engagements with life and the self. In a similar 
vein, Jon Mair’s chapter demonstrates how Inner Mongolian Buddhists utilize 
discourses of humility and ignorance that actively encourage an ‘effortful pursuit of 
an ethic of detachment’. In her commentary, Marilyn Strathern uses two vantage 
points to gain purchase on this section; Melanesian kinship forms reveal that 
detachment does not mean separation from social life, while relations in the British 
colonial Empire cultivated necessary modes of aloofness. Both vantages, Strathern 
argues, point to the ways in which we might think about the diverse subject positions 
that stem from the detachments we see in these four chapters, and the types of 
knowledge about how one must act in relation to self and others.  
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The chapters of this book situate detachment in diverse actions, ideological positions, 
modes of relationality and subjective projects. Collectively they demonstrate the 
shifting terrains of detachment, its dynamic relationships to modes of engagement, 
and the ways in which, for many groups and actors, detachment operates as a valued 
and productive type of knowledge or action. 
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1
 Although setting this detached relationship up actually took some fairly hands-on 
intervention (Candea 2013a) and indeed allowed a range of other experimental 
manipulations to take place (Candea 2013b). 
 
2
 Some of these include Mol (2002b), Kohn (2007), Gershon (2010), Simpson (1997), 
Shryock (1997), Reed (2003). 
 
3
 Latour’s most recent work on modes of existence, with its metaphysics of gaps and 
micro-transcendences, is closer to a genuinely symmetrical account. 
 
4
 It might be worth noting in this context, that the very term detachment contains a 
relationalist bias of its own, insofar as it implies the outcome of a process. The 
implication then is that detachment –if it is ever achieved– is what comes after the 
relation. Detachment in this sense is inherently a ‘post-relational’ term (Pedersen 
2013) rather than a non-relational or radically anti-relational one. Consider by 
contrast the radical anti-relationalism of a philosopher such as Quentin Meillassoux 
(2008), for whom what is at stake is not just the possibility of getting out of, breaking 
or cutting relations a posteriori, but the possibility of imagining a reality before 
relations. 
 
5
 For an excellent account of ‘kinds’ of relations, see Strathern (2011) 
